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Abstract
The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively
studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details be-
come crucial on heterogeneous populations where individuals may possess
diverse traits. By introducing a coevolutionary model in which not only
strategies but also individual dynamical features may evolve we revealed that
the formerly established conclusion is not necessarily true when different up-
dating rules are on stage. In particular, we apply two strategy updating
rules, imitation and Death-Birth rule, which allow local selection in a spatial
system. Our observation highlights that the microscopic feature of dynamics,
like the level of learning activity, could be a fundamental factor even if all
players share the same trait uniformly.
Keywords: cooperation, social dilemma, imitation, death-birth rule
1. Introduction
Cooperation among self-interested actors is a widespread phenomenon
that bridges several otherwise disjunct disciplines [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. This seem-
ingly paradoxical behavior, where individual and collective interests are in
conflict, provides a major challenge for our century [6]. Not surprisingly, an
armada of scientists with different backgrounds are trying to identify deci-
sive factors which may explain the evolutionary success of altruistic choice
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Albeit a clear and intuitive taxonomy of
potential cooperation supporting mechanisms was already given by Martin
Nowak [16], but this framework can mostly be considered as an inspiring
starting point for subsequent research efforts.
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One of the main research paths reveals the possible diverse consequences
of different strategy updating rules on the evolution of competing strategies
[17, 19, 20, 21]. When imitation is used, which is the most frequently applied
strategy updating rule [22], it turned out that the accompanying individual
features, such as strategy learning or teaching capacity, could be a decisive
factor if we assume a heterogeneous population where actors may differ from
each other [23]. Even if we assume diverse actors the consequences of varying
learning or varying teaching capacities are largely different. While diverse
learning activity has no particular role on cooperation level the possibility
of unequal teaching activity allows network reciprocity to be augmented in
a similar way that was observed previously for largely heterogeneous inter-
action graphs [24]. More precisely, a player having large strategy teaching
capacity is able to enforce her strategy to her local neighborhood [25]. In this
way locally coordinated homogeneous spots emerge which reveals the advan-
tage of mutual cooperation. It is crucial to stress, however, that the benefit
of individual strategy teaching capacity is only visible if players are hetero-
geneous, but disappears if players are uniform and bear identical dynamical
features. In the latter case the final evolutionary outcome is independent of
the proper value of the uniformly applied teaching or learning activity.
In this work we explore weather the individual dynamical features of ac-
tors, like strategy learning or strategy teaching capacities, play any role on
the evolution of cooperation when there are different ways to update their
strategies. For this purpose we assume that both imitation and Death-Birth
(DB) updating rules are available and we also suppose that the mentioned
dynamical features of players may change individually [17]. In particular, we
assume that players may have lower or higher strategy learning capacities
which may change during the evolutionary process. In an alternative setup
we assume distinct strategy teaching activities and clarify whether they af-
fect the evolutionary outcome when both imitation and Death-Birth rules
are present. We stress that both mentioned updating protocols assume only
information about local neighborhood hence their alternative use does not
cause fundamental differences. The latter would not be hold for those up-
dating rules which use global information about the entire population. For
example, when Birth-Death (BD) updating is used a player is chosen for
reproduction from the entire population proportional to fitness. In a sim-
ilar way, global information, the average level of fitness, is necessary when
replicator dynamics is applied. To avoid incomparable features of updating
protocols we only use imitation and DB rule.
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We note that the simultaneous use of different strategy updating rules can
be introduced in two basically distinct ways. According to the first scenario,
which is conceptually similar to an annealed randomness, a player may use
either imitation or can be the subject to a Death-Birth process, but these
updating protocols are used with a specific probability. In the other case,
which resembles quenched randomness, a player uses one of the mentioned
updating rules exclusively, but the fraction of those players who belongs to a
specific set is well-defined. We note that considering an adaptive population
where players playing a skill game was reported in [18].
In the following we will show that the way how we mix the updating rules
can be a decisive factor on the resulting cooperation level. Interestingly, the
level of strategy learning capacity is more important factor than the strength
of teaching capacity, which is against our previous experience when only a
single strategy updating protocol was present [23].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Sec-
tion we describe the model and survey the possible versions of the proposed
evolutionary games. Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of our observa-
tions. Finally, we summarize the main conclusions and discuss their potential
implications in Section 4.
2. Model and Method
We consider a population of individuals who play the so-called weak pris-
oner’s dilemma game on a graph [26]. In this simplified version, which still
captures the essence of a social dilemma, we only have a single parameter
T that characterizes the strength of the dilemma. Initially each player on
site i is designated as either a cooperator (C) or a defector (D) with equal
probability. While mutual cooperation yields the reward R = 1 to both co-
operator players, mutual defection results in zero payoff to the partners. The
same zero payoff goes to a cooperator who interacts with a defector, while the
latter collects the temptation T > 1 value, which establishes that defection
is the preferred individual choice.
For simplicity we present our results obtained on a L × L square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions, but we stress that qualitatively similar
behavior can be found by using other types of topologies including regular and
heterogeneous random graphs [27, 28]. According to the applied interaction
topology, when calculating the payoff of a player then we accumulate the
payoff values obtained from the pair interactions with all neighbors.
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In every Monte Carlo step in average all players have a chance to update
their strategies. During the strategy updating protocol we use Death-Birth
process with probability q and imitation rule with probability 1 − q. In
the former case a randomly chosen individual is removed and her neighbors
compete for the empty site proportional to their fitness. In the alternative
case, which happens with probability 1− q, the imitation rule is considered.
Accordingly, the randomly selected player i, having strategy si, imitates
the sj strategy of a neighboring player j with a probability Γ(sj → si) =
1/{1 + exp[(Πi −Πj)/K]}. Here Π denotes the accumulated payoffs of both
players while parameter K quantifies the uncertainty of strategy adoptions
[22]. To gain results comparable to previous studies we apply K = 0.1, but
our observations remain intact for wide range of noise interval.
It is crucial to note that the above mentioned strategy updating rules
use local selection, which is a fundamental feature when spatially structured
population is considered. In other words, we don’t need global information,
i.e. to know the accurate states of all players in the whole population, when
a microscopic strategy update is executed.
The above specified mixture of strategy updating rules resembles annealed
randomness in statistical physics [29]. We also introduce an alternative way
how to apply Death-Birth and imitation rules simultaneously. In the latter
case, which is conceptually similar to quenched randomness in solid-state
physics, a specific player always uses one of these rules. But the fraction
of those sites where Death-Birth is applied is q, while the remaining 1 − q
portion of the population use imitation to update their states.
Since our principal interest is to clarify whether an individual dynamical
feature influences the final outcome we also introduce a certain trait which
determines the success of the imitation process locally. For example, we can
assume that players have different abilities to learn from their neighbors,
which can be described by a 0 < wl ≤ 1 parameter. Consequently, when a
player i imitates a player j then we assume a modified imitation probability
that is Γ′(sj → si) = wl(i)/{1+exp[(Πi−Πj)/K]}. For simplicity, we assume
that two different values, wl < 1 and wl = 1, are available in the initial
state and these individual learning capacities are also adopted during the
imitation process. The key questions are whether different individual traits
coexist in the stationary state and how the specific value of wl influences the
cooperation level. We note that the value of wl has no any significance in
the classical model where all players use the same value and individual state
can be varied via imitation only.
4
Evidently, individual strategy teaching capacity can also be introduced.
In this case when a player i imitates a player j then we assume a modified
imitation probability that is Γ′(sj → si) = wt(j)/{1 + exp[(Πi − Πj)/K]}.
Again, for simplicity, we assume that two different values, wt < 1 and wt = 1,
are available in the initial state and these individual teaching capacities are
also adopted during the imitation process.
To summarize the model definition, practically we study four fundamen-
tally different setups. In the first case we assume cooperator and defector
players who may have different learning capacities and the microscopic up-
dating process is executed via an annealed mixture of Death-Birth and imi-
tation rules. In the second case we use quenched mixture of updating rules
for the same players. Thirdly, we assume players who have different teach-
ing activities with annealed mixture of updating rules. Finally, the players
with heterogeneous teaching capacities are updated by a quenched mixture
of microscopic protocols.
3. Results
We start with the presentation of key findings for the first two cases.
These results are summarized in the phase diagrams plotted in Fig. 1. The
control parameters are the T temptation value and the q probability that
characterizes the weight of Death-Birth update in the microscopic dynamics.
As we noted, here four different microscopic states compete for space during
the coevolutionary process. They are cooperators with low (CL) and high
(CH) learning capacities and defectors with low (DL) and high (DH) imitation
skill.
It is a mutual feature of both phase diagrams that players with high learn-
ing activity cannot survive in the stationary states. The only exception is at
high q – low T values where defectors die out first leaving behind cooperator
players with different learning capacities. We marked this uniform-strategy
state by “C” where learning capacity of players becomes irrelevant. The sys-
tem arrives to a similar uniform-strategy state at low q – high T parameter
values where cooperators die out first and defectors with different learning
skills remained alive (this state is marked by “D” on the diagrams).
When the updating rules are mixed in an annealed way, shown in the
left panel of Fig. 1, then the positive effect of the Death-Birth updating rule
can be observed already at small q values. Here the full cooperator state can
be easily reached even at relatively high T values. Interestingly, CL marks a
5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
T
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C CL
D
CL+DL
C
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
T
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0C
D
CL+DL
C
Figure 1: Phase diagram of the coevolutionary model with heterogeneous learning activity
obtained for annealed (left) and quenched (right) mixture of updating rules when wl = 0.1
is used beside the usual wl = 1 value. The applied microscopic dynamics is explained in
the main text. D denotes the phase where cooperators with different learning capacities
die out first and only defectors remain. Alternatively, C denotes the parameter region
where defectors go extinct leaving back cooperators with different learning capacities.
Interestingly, CL marks also a full cooperator phase, but here defectors and cooperators
with higher learning capacity die out simultaneously. In the intermediate phase, where
cooperators and defectors coexist, only players with low learning activity survive. The
results were obtained up to L = 2000 system size and remain robust in the large size limit.
phase where players with high learning capacities die out first that is followed
by DL players and finally CL players prevail exclusively. If we increase the
temptation at a fixed q value then the system terminates into a mixed state
where CL and DL players coexist. Nevertheless, the most striking feature of
the diagram is that the influence of Death-Birth process emerges very early
even at small q values if we initially allow players to be present with different
learning capacities.
The above described effect is completely missing if we mix the updating
rules in a quenched way. This case is summarized in the right panel of Fig. 1.
Here the positive consequence of the presence of Death-Birth rule emerges
only at high q values where those players who follow this protocol percolate,
hence they can support each other mutually.
To gain a deeper insight about the microscopic mechanisms which govern
the pattern formation we present a characteristic spatial evolution of the four
competing states for both cases. In particular, we show the case of annealed
mixture of updating rules, where some representative snapshots are plotted
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Figure 2: Coevolution of strategies and learning capacities at T = 1.3 and q = 0.2.
Panel (a) shows the starting state where players with high learning capacities (wl = 1)
are distributed in the left side of the space. Here DH defector players (dark red) and
CH cooperators (dark blue) are present. The right side of the initial panel is filled with
players with low learning capacities (wl = 0.1). They are DL defectors (light red) and
CL cooperators (light blue). When evolution is launched, shown in panel (b), DH players
invade CH players. In parallel, CL players beat DH players, which will result in the
extinction of both CH and DH states. In the final stationary state, shown in panel (d),
CL and DL players coexist despite of the high temptation value. Linear system size is
L = 400.
in Fig. 2. The first panel of Fig. 2 shows a prepared initial state where
we separated players with different learning capacities in different sides of
the available space. More precisely, players having high learning capacities
(wl = 1) are separated on the left side. They are DH defectors (dark red) and
CH cooperator players (dark blue). Initially, on the right side are those who
have low, wl = 0.1, learning capacities. Here DL defectors are denoted by
light red, while CL cooperators by light blue. When the evolution is launched
the two subsystems evolve very differently. While DH players invade CH
players efficiently, resulting a homogeneous dark red domain, DL and CL
players coexist on the right side. Simultaneously, light blue CL players start
invading DH opponents as it is shown in panel (b). It will result in the
extinction of DH state, shown in panel (c), but the homogeneous CL domain
is unstable due to the high T and low q value. The final stable state is
shown in panel (d) where low learning activity defectors and cooperators
coexist. (To monitor the whole evolution we provided an animation that can
be seen in [30].) This example illustrates nicely that the individual dynamical
feature, viz. learning capacity, can play a decisive role on the stationary state
even if it is uniform for all players. The important condition is the presence
of multiple updating rules: while cooperators cannot survive when players
possess high learning capacities, they coexist with defectors if wl is low, no
matter we applied a significantly strong temptation value.
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Figure 3: Cooperation level in dependence of the suppressed learning capacity for annealed
(left) and quenched (right) mixture of updating rules. The applied parameter values are
shown in the legend. While suppressed learning capacity has a decisive role on cooperation
level for the annealed case, it is irrelevant for the other case when players use permanently
a certain type of updating rules.
The above described mechanism cannot work for quenched mixture of
updating rules because the positive consequence of Death-Birth rule is ineffi-
cient when the sites which use this protocol are rare. If they cannot percolate
then they are surrounded by sites where only imitation is used. The latter
updating rule provides a significantly modest cooperation level and coopera-
tors die out at every reasonable T value. It simply means that only defectors
will compete for the empty place where Death-Birth rule is used, hence the
total failure of cooperation is inevitable. This situation can only change
when Death-Birth places are dense enough to percolate. Above the perco-
lation threshold [29] these sites become neighboring and their neighborhood
should not necessarily follow the evolutionary trajectory dictated by pure im-
itation dynamics. In agreement with this argument, the right panel of Fig. 1
illustrates nicely that cooperation can only maintain in the high q regime.
Put differently, the quenched mixture of updating rules does not provide
any synergistic effect and practically we have two “subsystems” where either
imitation or Death-Birth-type updating rule is functioning. (We should not
forget that the latter is functioning properly only at high q values.) Since
we practically have “subsystems” using a single-updating rule, therefore the
individual dynamical feature becomes unimportant again. As we already
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Figure 4: Phase diagram of the coevolutionary model with heterogeneous teaching activity
obtained for annealed (left) and quenched (right) mixture of updating rules when wt = 0.1
is applied beside the usual wt = 1 value. As for Fig. 1, color codes illustrate the stationary
cooperation level at specific parameter values of q and T . In the intermediate phase, where
cooperators and defectors coexist, only players with high teaching activity survive. The
results were obtained up to L = 2000 system size and remain robust in the large size limit.
mentioned in the introduction, in the traditional model, where only imita-
tion is used, the actual value of wl plays no any role if all actors possess the
same trait [23]. According to this argument we should obtain the same evolu-
tionary outcome independently of the applied wl value if quenched mixture of
updating rules is applied. This conjecture is nicely confirmed in Fig. 3 where
we plotted the cooperation level in dependence of wl lower teaching activity
both for annealed (left) and quenched (right) randomness. As we previously
stressed, in case of annealed randomness this dynamical feature has an im-
portant role on the final outcome and by changing only this parameter we
can span from a full defection to a full cooperation state. Furthermore, this
sensitivity on wl value remains valid independently of the applied 0 < q < 1
value. But these features, as we argued above, disappear for the quenched
mixing case. In the latter case only the value of q counts. This is illustrated
nicely on the right panel where we obtained higher cooperation level at higher
temptation value for larger q.
In the rest of this paper we discuss the cases when heterogeneous strat-
egy teaching activity is assumed. This dynamical feature was proved to be
relevant in previous studies [23, 25, 31]. Now, similarly to the learning cases,
four different microscopic states compete for space during the coevolutionary
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process. They are cooperators with low (CL) and high (CH) teaching capac-
ities and defectors with low (DL) and high (DH) convincing skill. The key
observations are summarized in Fig. 4 for both cases.
In case of annealed mixture of strategies, shown in the left panel, we
can see that the previously reported spread of full cooperator state on the
q − T plane is limited. There are still full cooperator state in the high q –
low T corner, which is composed by CL and CH players, but the majority of
parameter space is dominated by full defector phase. Between them, in the
mixed phase, cooperators and defectors with high teaching ability coexist.
Based on our previous experience with learning activities, the case of
quenched mixture, plotted on the right panel of Fig.4, is less surprising. As
previously, we can detect nonzero cooperation level only at high q and low
T values.
To understand better the microscopic mechanisms which are responsi-
ble for these outcomes we present a series of snapshots obtained from an
evolutionary process of annealed mixing in Fig. 5. Similar to the previous
demonstration we use a prepared initial state again where players with high
teaching activity are distributed randomly on the left side of panel (a). They
are DH (dark red) and CH (dark blue) players. On the right side of the
starting panel players with low teaching capacities are present. They are DL
(light blue) and CL (light red) players. Starting evolution from these random
states we can observe that both pairs of cooperator states coexist with its
own defector partner at this T − q parameter values. Interestingly, the com-
bination of CL+DL provides a larger cooperation level than the combination
of CH + DH states. This is visible on panel (b) where the former domain is
almost blue while the latter is mostly red. This is the manifestation of the
dynamic-sensitive cooperation we already reported when suppressed learning
activities were used.
Rather unexpectedly, however, the solution with lower general coopera-
tion level is more stable and gradually invades the other solution. Technically,
it happens via the invasion of DH state which beats CL players who will die
out first, as it is illustrated in panel (c). The remaining DL spots are invaded
by CH players and the system finally evolves into a state where DH and CH
players coexist by giving a modest cooperation level. (The whole evolution
can be followed in the animation we provided in [32].)
The above presented pattern formation explains why we obtain signifi-
cantly less average cooperation in the left panel of Fig. 4 comparing to the
left panel of Fig. 1. Albeit a higher cooperation level would be available
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Figure 5: Coevolution of strategies and individual teaching capacities at T = 1.4 and
q = 0.4. Panel (a) shows the starting state where players with high teaching capacities
are distributed in the left side of the space. Here DH defector players (dark red) and
CH cooperators (dark blue) are present. The right side of the initial panel is filled with
players with low teaching capacities (wt = 0.1). They are DL defectors (light red) and
CL cooperators (light blue). When evolution is launched, shown in panel (b), two sub-
solutions emerge where DH +CH coexist on the left, while DL +CL coexist on the right.
The latter is not stable because DH players invade CL players very fast, leaving a full
defector area which is composed by DH and DL players (shown in panel (c)). However,
this state is not stable again because CH players can invade the DL spots. The final state
is composed by DH and CH players, but the fraction of the latter strategy is moderate.
Linear system size is L = 400.
by using players with lower teaching ability but they are vulnerable against
those who have higher teaching activity. This will result in the latter group’s
victory with a moderate cooperation level.
The comparison of the left panels of Fig. 1 and Fig. 4(b) illustrates nicely
our previous conclusion obtained at Fig.3. More precisely, the mentioned
phase diagrams for quenched randomness are practically identical, highlight-
ing that the individual values of dynamical features have no relevant impor-
tance on the final outcome when updating rules are mixed in a quenched way.
In the latter case the only decisive factor is the fraction of those sites where
Death-Birth rule is applied: if this portion is above the percolation threshold
then cooperators can survive at not too large T values. Otherwise, when
this portion is below this threshold then the system behavior is practically
identical to the classic model when imitation is used by all players [33].
4. Discussion
In this work we have explored the possible impact of multiple strategy
updating rules on the cooperation level when players with different individual
dynamical traits are present. The latter can be strategy learning or teaching
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capacities which determine the success of a microscopic imitation process. In
a uniform system, where all players possess the same trait, these dynamical
features have no relevant impact on the stationary state that is obtained as
the final destination of an evolutionary process. Our work highlighted that
this picture is inaccurate when different updating rules are present because
the cooperation level may depend sensitively on the dynamical details. Inter-
estingly, the individual learning skill of players are more important than the
strategy teaching capacity and by varying the value of the former parameter
we can reach a full cooperator state where payoff values would dictate a full
defector state otherwise.
We also pointed out the way how to mix updating rules is also impor-
tant. When a player can apply both imitation and Death-Birth rule via an
annealed-like mixing then the above mentioned synergy can be observed. But
this phenomenon is completely missing when the simultaneous presence of
updating rules is realized in a way when different players use different rules
permanently. The latter mix resembles a quenched randomness where we
observe the sum of simpler subsystems using a singular updating rule. As a
consequence, the system behavior is very similar to those we can see for tra-
ditional single-rule models. We stress that our observations about structured
populations are robust and remain valid for non-regular interaction graphs
as well.
It is worth noting that the simultaneous application of different updating
rules within a single system is a recently opened direction [34, 35] which may
help to answer the long-standing debate whether which rule is evolutionary
viable and which one captures the key element of a realistic system [36, 37,
38]. Our work warrants that several microscopic details can be important
while other previously decisive conditions become irrelevant when multiple
rules govern the evolution. We hope that our work will be a stimulating step
for future research works along this path.
This research was supported by the Hungarian National Research Fund
(Grant K-120785).
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